The Portuguese Competition Authority (AdC) announced its decision to initiate an in-depth, Phase II investigation into the proposed acquisition of Acaíl, SA by Linde Portugal, SA. This escalation means that the regulator has identified potential “significant obstacles to effective competition” within the national markets for industrial and medical gases, as well as home healthcare services. Under Portuguese Competition Law, this transition to a more rigorous analytical phase occurs when a preliminary probe fails to rule out harmful market impacts, necessitating supplementary due diligence.
The concentration involves two primary players in the supply of essential gases. Linde Portugal, part of the globally dominant Linde group, maintains a robust presence across various industrial sectors and operates Linde Saúde, which provides home respiratory care and rehabilitation services. Acaíl serves as a direct competitor in these same spheres, offering not only industrial and medical gases but also clinical monitoring and technical support for homebound patients. The AdC’s preliminary due diligence suggests that the merger could fundamentally alter the competitive landscape by removing the direct pressure these two entities currently exert on one another.
Beyond the immediate horizontal overlap, the AdC is closely examining potential vertical foreclosure effects. The preliminary investigation indicates that a combined Linde-Acaíl entity might gain the power to restrict wholesale gas supplies to smaller, independent operators. Because these third-party retailers often depend on larger wholesalers for their supply, the AdC is concerned that the merger could be used to squeeze competitors out of the retail market, ultimately reducing choice and increasing costs for intermediate and end users.
It is important to note that the decision to move into Phase II is a procedural step and “does not constitute a final decision on the operation.” The AdC is now entering a period of intensified investigation to determine if the transaction, as currently structured, would result in a detrimental market monopoly. At the conclusion of this phase, the regulator will either clear the deal—potentially with mandated commitments or divestments—or prohibit it entirely if it concludes that the merger would irreparably damage the competitive integrity of the Portuguese gas and healthcare sectors.