In 2024, the European Commission formally charged Cermaq, Grieg Seafood, Bremnes, Lerøy, Mowi, and SalMar with colluding in the market for spot sales of Norwegian farmed Atlantic salmon in the EU. Between 2011 and 2019, the six salmon producers exchanged sensitive information to reduce market uncertainty and push prices up.
The regulator is still working on the case, and most of the companies have contested the charges rather than cooperated. But when we look at the numbers, we might understand their stance. The potential gains from the alleged cartel may have outweighed the risks.
For the sake of analysis, we’ll run this exercise as if the companies were to be fined—though of course, that outcome is not guaranteed. Let’s take three of them—Grieg Seafood, Lerøy, and SalMar—and crunch some numbers.
Grieg Seafood
To simplify the calculations, we’ll assume Grieg receives the maximum possible fine: 10% of its annual revenue. While that might seem like a harsh assumption, it’s not unrealistic for a company with a single core product and an alleged cartel lasting nine years. Based on Grieg’s financial reports, for the final year of the alleged infringement (2019), that could translate to around €40 million.
Below are Grieg’s profit margins over those years. Are these margins unusually high? Some regulators have flagged significantly lower margins as suspicious from a competition standpoint.
| Grieg | Revenue (NOK in millions) | Gross profit margin | Operating income | Operating income margin | EBIT | Net profit margin |
| 2015 | 4,591.60 | 12.10% | 109.00 | 2.37% | 118.3 | 2.58% |
| 2016 | 6,563.80 | 43.00% | 1,624.30 | 24.75% | 1,677.60 | 25.56% |
| 2017 | 7,038.40 | 7.20% | 835.30 | 11.87% | 814.20 | 11.57% |
| 2018 | 7,557.30 | 7.40% | 1,313.80 | 17.38% | 1,362.20 | 18.02% |
| 2019 | 4,779.10 | -36.80% | 853.30 | 17.85% | 818.20 | 17.12% |
In addition to a potential EU fine, it’s worth considering the damages that retailers are claiming from salmon producers in civil lawsuits. In the UK alone, major supermarket chains estimate their losses at €807 million. There’s also a class action from consumers, though salmon farmers are unlikely to pay both, thanks to the pass-on defence. Again, this is a simplified view, but it helps us get a ballpark figure.
If we divide the €807 million equally among the eight defendants, each could be looking at around €100 million in claims—though those with larger sales volumes would likely pay more. For Grieg, that could mean €40 million in EU fines plus €100 million in UK damages, with likely more claims coming from elsewhere in Europe.
Now, if Grieg were to apply for leniency, it could avoid the €40 million fine. But leniency has trade-offs. The company would likely face more civil claims, and its legal defence would be harder, given the evidence it would need to provide to regulators to secure immunity.
But what about the benefits of the cartel?
First, damage claims essentially reflect the illicit gains from the cartel. So, we could assume that Grieg earned at least €100 million in extra revenue in the UK alone during the infringement period.
Looking at the broader picture, Grieg’s gross profits grew from €150 million in 2015 to €325 million in 2019. While not all of that increase can be directly linked to the alleged cartel, it’s reasonable to think that part of it was influenced by reduced competition.
And then there’s the stock market. From 2011 to 2019—the period of the alleged infringement—Grieg’s share price rose by around 560%, adding approximately €9 billion in market value. Again, not all of that can be attributed to cartel behavior, but these numbers help explain why some companies may see the risks as worth taking.
Lerøy Seafood Group
To keep the analysis simple, we’ll just lay out the key figures for Lerøy Seafood, since the same logic we used for Grieg also applies here. Assuming a maximum fine of 10% of global revenue, Lerøy could be facing a penalty of around €171 million. As for damage claims, we’ll again use the same rough estimate as for Grieg—€100 million—though the actual figure is likely higher given Lerøy’s larger sales volume.
Profit margins (NOK in millions).
| Leroy | Revenue | Gross profit margin | Operating income | Operating income margin | EBIT | Net profit margin |
| 2015 | 13,450.70 | 35.90% | 1,615.20 | 12.01% | 1,534.30 | 11.41% |
| 2016 | 17,269.30 | 49.10% | 4,577.50 | 26.51% | 4,313.60 | 24.98% |
| 2017 | 18,623.50 | 38.90% | 2,261.00 | 12.14% | 2,004.40 | 10.76% |
| 2018 | 19,837.60 | 51.50% | 4,612.60 | 23.25% | 4,281.10 | 21.58% |
| 2019 | 20,426.90 | 43.60% | 2,558.20 | 12.52% | 2,373.30 | 11.62% |
What about the benefits?
As explained before, the damage claims represent the illicit gains, so we can start with €100 million. Then, the company’s gross profits rose from €405 million (2015) to €747 million (2019). As for the companies valuation, it rose, approximately, €27 billion.
Salmar
We’ll apply the same simplified approach to SalMar. Assuming a maximum fine of 10% of global revenue, the potential penalty would be around €102 million. For damage claims, we’ll again use the €100 million estimate—likely more than Grieg’s share but less than Lerøy’s, based on relative sales volumes.
Profit margins (NOK in millions).
| Salmar | Revenue | Gross profit margin | Operating income | Operating income margin | EBIT | Net profit margin |
| 2015 | 7,303.50 | 50.40% | 1,479.00 | 20.25% | 1,473.40 | 20.17% |
| 2016 | 9,003.30 | 64.60% | 3,443.40 | 38.25% | 3,141.60 | 34.89% |
| 2017 | 10,798.70 | 45.20% | 2,952.10 | 27.34% | 2,629.40 | 24.35% |
| 2018 | 11,322.20 | 65.00% | 4,557.70 | 40.25% | 4,409.70 | 38.95% |
| 2019 | 12,229.80 | 49.40% | 3,316.10 | 27.11% | 2,912.30 | 23.81% |
What about the benefits?
As explained before, the damage claims represent the illicit gains, so we can start with €100 million. Then, the company’s gross profits rose from €308 million (2015) to €507 million (2019). As for the companies valuation, approximately, it rose €48 billion.
Note to Investors – Can they pay?
Can the companies afford to pay the fines without much trouble? Here, not all three salmon producers are in the same boat. The data suggests that Grieg is in a weaker financial position compared to the other two. Below is the free cash flow (FCF) reported by each company for 2024. FCF represents the cash a company has available to repay creditors or distribute to shareholders—essentially, funds that are free to settle liabilities.
- Grieg: -€71 million (not enough to cover a potential fine of 10% of global turnover)
- Lerøy: €31 million (also not enough to cover a potential fine of 10%)
- SalMar: €300 million (enough to pay a potential fine of 10% without much strain)
Why does this matter? For several reasons:
- If a company doesn’t have the cash, it may need to take on debt to pay the fine.
- Shareholders could be unhappy if the company has to cut or suspend dividends to conserve cash.
- Investors might shift positions within the sector if they believe the financial impact of fines will hit competitors unequally.
Grieg appears to be in the most fragile position—and this is also reflected in its performance relative to peers in broader benchmark comparisons.
