Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Commission (Cofece) has decided to close the proceedings brought against Google for alleged relative monopolistic practices in the national market for digital advertising services, specifically, an alleged tying arrangement involving search engine ad space and other advertising services. The case, originally launched in 2020 and formally brought to trial in 2023, concluded after an oral hearing held in May 2025, during which Google presented its final arguments.
According to Cofece’s public statement, the Board of Commisioners concluded that there was no real imposition or coercion on the part of Google. As a result, the conduct in question did not amount to a prohibited practice under Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Law (Ley Federal de Competencia Económica, LFCE), which forbids tying arrangements when they have or may have anticompetitive effects. Consequently, the case file was closed without imposing any sanction.
Divergence from International Standards
Cofece’s decision stands in sharp contrast to the actions taken by competition authorities in other jurisdictions regarding similar conduct. In the United States, for instance, a federal court ruled in 2023 that Google had unlawfully monopolized the online search and advertising markets. The Department of Justice subsequently proposed structural remedies, including divestiture of certain advertising operations. The judge still needs to rule on the proposed divestitures.
Moreover, U.S. and European authorities have consistently held that Google’s contractual mechanisms, such as payments to manufacturers in exchange for remaining the default search engine, may constitute indirect restraints on competition, even absent formal coercion. In such cases, regulators have applied a more demanding standard of analysis toward dominant platforms, particularly in digital markets characterized by network effects and data leverage.
Regulator’s Decision Will be Important
The resolution adopted by Cofece’s Plenary has implications not only for Mexico’s digital advertising market, but also for the broader scope of behavioral control under the LFCE within the digital ecosystem. The legal community will likely be looking forward to reading the public version of the decision to better understand the economic and legal reasoning behind this decision.
Given the institutional significance of the case, access to the legal, economic, and evidentiary grounds that led to the case’s closure without sanction will be critical to assess the reasons that drove the regulator to divert from some of the international precedents in this space.
The case will likely offer important lessons on evidentiary thresholds, procedural dynamics in digital environments, and the boundaries of antitrust enforcement vis-à-vis large digital platforms in Mexico.
Last, it will be interesting to see whether the decision was adopted unanimously or by majority, and to understand the specific position taken by each Commissioner. Special attention should also be paid to any dissenting or concurring opinions, as these often contain not only formal disagreement but also substantive legal and economic analysis that contributes to the development of competition law in Mexico. Such votes may offer alternative views on evidentiary assessment, theories of harm, or the characterization of substantial market power—and provide valuable input for the evolution of antitrust enforcement in digital markets.
